At the level of the individual, human behavioral ecology applies foraging theory to resource offtake decisions (e.g., Alvard 1998) and expands on these models to predict how exogenous changes (i.e. new markets and technology) can shift the costs and benefits of different resource extraction strategies (Smith and Wishnie 2000) . Where differences in access to labor and cash (or even variation in religious prescriptions) leave some individuals better situated than others to reap the benefits from such changes, the impact of conservation interventions can be modeled and hypotheses generated for empirical test (e.g., Godoy 2001) . Optimal foraging analyses can also be scaled up into predator-prey population models. Winterhalder and Lu (1997) , for example, find (somewhat counter-intuitively) that introduced domestic species can increase pressure on an over-hunted preferred species by supporting higher human population densities. With such tools social scientists can predict the kinds of social inequities that so frequently result from conservation projects (e.g., McAfee 1999), and make recommendations for wiser and more forward-looking interventions.
Furthermore, to the extent that payoffs to conservation behavior (or stinting) depend on the time frames within which individuals operate, an examination of the full suite of economic alternatives to (destructive) harvesting becomes critical. Here again evolutionary anthropologists have taken the lead (Rogers 1991) , exploring how differences in time discounting within populations (Reyes-Garcia et al. 2007 ) can render certain individuals or production strategies particularly vulnerable to new management regimes. These studies are written in language comprehensible to any ecologist trained in evolutionary thinking, and provide fundamental building blocks for determining how a project to conserve natural resources may ameliorate and/or enhance inequities in resource access, income or other goods across the human population.
Other specializations in the social sciences take us beyond individual motivation and behavior. As Hardin (1968) recognized, getting to grips with the dynamics of coordination and cooperation is key. Here institutional and political economists' work on collective action has been pivotal (Ostrom 1990) , and increasingly converges with strictly evolutionary analyses of cooperation (e.g., Richerson, Boyd, and Paciotti 2002) . Phrasing conservation dilemmas as collective action problems delineates clear models that can be applied not only to the behavior of individuals harvesting natural resources (Ruttan and Borgerhoff Mulder 1999 ) but also to the design of institutions governing cooperation. We now know a great deal about what kinds of institutions result in successful resource management and why (Agrawal 2002) , and we can use this knowledge to generate (Agrawal and Redford 2006) and test (Brooks et al. 2006 ) hypotheses for which conservation solutions might work. Here again social science has the tools to map out quantitative predictions about the sorts of policy initiatives that might be effective, given local conditions. For example Ruttan (2006) follows Baland and Platteau (1999) to determine how some forms of community heterogeneity might facilitate collective action over conservation whereas other forms might impede conservation, and tests her predictions against natural resource management program outcomes. Finally political ecologists tackle the issue of within and between country inequities with regard to resource utilization, through recognition of subnational and national elites as herders on an international commons.
In short, Chan and his collaborators are right to worry about the losers and winners in conservation initiatives, but fail to recognize that social scientists have tools to predict who these might be, and why. So what is the real problem? Are conservation NGOs employing too few social scientists? Or do they feel that biologists can do as good a job? Are social scientists not publishing their conservation-related work in the right place? I suspect that the difficulties in implementing just conservation interventions have little to do with a lack of knowledge, foresight or prediction. Rather they result from (often uncontrollable) higher-level national and international trends -migration, pricing, land use policy, global trade, etc. Conservation biologists' principle challenge is not
